Research has shown that relationship banking matters for borrowers. In this article I utilize a regression discontinuity design to provide evidence that a concrete channel, the reallocation of control rights to creditors following a covenant violation, explains some positive effects relationship lending has on borrowers. Investment experiences a smaller reduction and the likelihood of a company exit increases less dramatically when there are well developed relationships. Exploring which exact lender actions are responsible for these results, I find that relationship banks are more willing to renegotiate loans, extend maturities, ramp up volumes and grant covenant waivers upon violations.
suggests benefits during periods of crisis or borrower distress with regards to a greater supply of loans (Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein, 1990 , 1991 Elsas & Krahnen, 1998; Jiangli, Unal & Yom, 2008; Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta & Mistrulli, 2016; Beck, Degryse, Haas & van Horen, 2018) , better terms in new contracts (Bodenhorn, 2003; Jiangli et al., 2008; Bolton et al., 2016; Li, Lu & Srinivasan, 2017) and more favorable management of existing loans by the bank 1 (Bodenhorn, 2003; Bolton et al., 2016) .
The primary goal of this article is to explore a different possible channel through which relationship affect borrowers: creditor control following a covenant violation.
I analyze differential effects on investment, firm exit and use loan renegotiations in an attempt to pin down how exactly relationship banks behave differently than transaction or arm's lengths lenders and which concrete creditor actions lead to different outcomes for borrowers.
A secondary end is to extend the empirical financial contracting literature and shed more light on why technical defaults matter by exploring lender-borrower related heterogeneity and by analyzing loan amendments on the level of individual credit contracts. Past research utilizing well identified regression discontinuity designs has so far only analyzed borrower level outcomes, documenting effects on investment (Chava & Roberts, 2008) , debt issuance (Roberts & Sufi, 2009a) , firm exit (Demiroglu & James, 2010) , employment (Falato & Liang, 2016) , and innovation (Gu, Mao & Tian, 2017) .
Covenant violations are a perfect setting to investigate empirically the impact creditors have on firms. When a company violates a debt covenant, creditors gain the right to accelerate the repayment of outstanding claims and to terminate unused portions of credit lines and revolving facilities. These actions often create a financial risk for borrowers, are associated with significant economic costs (Beneish & Press, 1993 , and increase the chance of bankruptcy (Demiroglu & James, 2010; Nini, Smith & Sufi, 2012) . Accordingly, the threat of exercising acceleration and termination rights upon such a "technical default" increases a bank's bargaining power vis-a-vis management and usually constitutes a broader de-facto transfer of control rights. Apart from ending relationships, lenders can withdraw funds partially, change terms by replacing or renegotiating existing credit contracts, extract fees, intervene with investment, fi-nancing and operative decisions, or grant waivers (Sufi, 2009; Chava & Roberts, 2008; Roberts & Sufi, 2009a; Roberts, 2015) . 2 In this paper I take advantage of these control reallocation events to analyze differential effects caused by pre-existing lending relationships between the defaulting debtor and the creditor that underwrote the violated contract. In my identification strategy I exploit the discrete nature of technical violation events for a regression discontinuity design in which I capture borrower differences (that correlate with default status) by including smooth functions of distance-to-default variables and by comparing firms that are close to the violation threshold, as in Chava & Roberts (2008) ; Roberts & Sufi (2009a) ; Demiroglu & James (2010) ; Falato & Liang (2016) ; Gu et al. (2017) . I address endogenous lender-borrower matching by estimating coefficients of interest only within the same borrower-lender pair, using interacted borrower × bank fixed effects. This still allows to exploit the variation from 40% of the estimation sample to calculate coefficients of interest. I show that results also hold for alternative solutions, such as a lender-borrower distance instrument (Bharath et al., 2011; Ross, 2010; López-Espinosa, Mayordomo & Moreno, 2017; Li et al., 2017) . Two different endogeneity problems do not seem to be significant: I show that early loan terminations and accelerated repayments cannot be explained by changes in observable borrower quality, and that relationship lenders are not more inclined to avoid covenant violations before they occur. I propose novel measures of relationship banking, combining relationship length, interaction frequency, and intensity/relative importance of a lender-borrower link in a single relationship index, or as an alternative, via a principal component analysis.
I find that the general reduction of investment is marginal (2% instead of 7.5%) when creditors have any preexisting relationship with the borrower, reenforcing Chava & Roberts (2008) . There is even no negative effect at all when more developed banking relations exist in shape of a lending history of at least 5 years, 5 or more previous lending interactions, or the contribution of 50% or more to the borrower's total loan volume received in the last 5 years. The increased threat of a distressed com-pany exit upon a technical default that others have documented (Demiroglu & James, 2010; Nini et al., 2012 ) is at least 26% higher when there is no relationship banking.
Relative to borrowers with the most intense relations, the increase in the exit likelihood is more than four times higher when arm's length relationships exist. Exploring the exact mechanism and how relationship banks behave differently when they are in control, I analyze the effect of covenant violations on loan renegotiations and creditor actions as in Roberts & Sufi (2009a,b) and Nini, Smith & Sufi (2009) . 3 Lenders generally do not exercise acceleration and termination rights or reduce outstanding volumes significantly upon a covenant violation. However, they become more passive, or less willing to renegotiate loans and to agree to introduce favorable amendments: loan renegotiations and favorable amendments become generally less likely after covenant violations. Relationship lenders are more inclined to renegotiate loans, waive or relax covenants and support debtors by increasing volumes, maturities and granting covenant waivers. Banks are less inclined to become passive when there are pre-existing lending relations. For very intimately linked lender-borrower pairs, favorable creditor actions become more likely. This suggests that relationship lenders not only abstain from harming borrowers by becoming less cooperative, but that banks respond to woes on the side of their most loyal borrowers with immediate and direct support on multiple fronts.
Findings are robust to different fixed effects specifications and estimation samples, to the exclusion of all control variables, to alternative measures of lending relationships, and to different solutions to the problem of endogenous lender-borrower matching. To increase confidence in the identifying assumptions of the analysis I conduct a range of validity checks, focussing on possible differences in the inclination of relationship lenders to prevent covenant violations or terminate relations with inferior quality borrowers.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 2 explains the identification strategy. Results are presented if section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Data
Loan data come from Thompson Reuter's DealScan database, which mainly compiles SEC information and has a coverage of over 75% of all commercial loans in the U.S.
since the mid-90s (Carey & Hrycray, 1999) . Using the linking table from Chava & Roberts (2008) available on Michael Robert's homepage and an additional own matching algorithm, contracts are matched to company data from S&P's CRSP/Compustat merged fundamental quarterly and CRSP Monthly Stock files. The sample used here includes loans by banks and non-banks to publicly listed U.S. non-financial corporations (excluding SIC codes 6000-6999) over the period Q1 1994 to Q4 2016 (relationship variables are computed using years prior to 1994, reaching back until 1987). 4 All variables are deflated to December 2011 using the All-Urban CPI and Winsorized at the 2.5 th and 97.5 th percentiles (unless they are in logarithms). 5 The final estimation sample contains 27,502 firm-quarters, corresponding to 2,118 unique firms and 3,650 "packages" or "deals" (using equation (2) in table 5 as a reference).
Dependent and Control Variables
I use five different dependent variables in this analysis: investment (CAPX) in percent of lagged total assets as in Chava & Roberts (2008) ; Demiroglu & James (2010) ; Falato & Liang (2016) ; an "exit indicator" that is 1 if a firm is liquidated or dropped from a stock exchange (implied by CRSP codes) and 0 otherwise as in Nini et al. (2012) and similar to Demiroglu & James (2010) and Bolton et al. (2016) ; 6 a "renegotiation indicator" that is 1 if there is a renegotiation of the package or of a facility inside the package as in Nini et al. (2009) , Roberts & Sufi (2009b), and Bodenhorn (2003) . 7 As in Roberts & Sufi (2009a) ; Chodorow-Reich (2014); Bolton et al. (2016) I also look at specific creditor actions, including a dummy that is 1 if there was either an increase 4 Observations after 2012 are matched using with the own algorithm, using company names, locations, industry codes and ticker symbol information.
5 Changing the intervals to 1 and 99 or 5 and 95 has no effect on any of the results. 6 Demiroglu & James (2010) defines a "bad outcome" more broadly that also includes loan terminations. In the analysis here I follow Nini et al. (2012) , since I do not want to confound such fundamentally different events and attempt to analyze different renegotiation outcomes separately. Bolton et al. (2016) uses Italian Credit Registry data. 7 The latter does not use DealScan data.
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in the loan's amount or maturity without a reduction in the respective other variable;
an indicator that is 1 if a covenant is waived, eliminated or relaxed; a dummy that is 1 if there is a loan termination, a payment acceleration, a maturity or volume reduction (without an increase in the respective other).
To the extended set of standard firm control variables from the literature (logarithm of total real assets, market-to-book ratio, cash flow ratio, leverage, asset tangibility, Z-Score) I add controls required for the analysis of lending relationships: dummy variables for rating classes, firm age, the number of participating lenders in a contract, the number of lead banks (both in logs), the share of the total loan volume held by the lead bank(s). In the deal-level analysis of loan renegotiations I further add a rich set of loan controls (fixed effects for loan purpose, contract type, and all major loan terms).
These are described in detail in table 8 in the appendix. Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables used in the regressions, for the entire estimation sample for two subsamples resulting from a split according to a preexisting lender-borrower relation dummy. In one sample loans are not associated with any relationship whatsoever while the other sample contains contracts where borrowers and lenders have some form of previous interaction. The significant differences in means of most variables, the implications for the identification strategy and remedies are discussed in section 2.3.
In table 2 I also provide further detail on the frequency of firm exit and renegotiation events used as dependent variables in my regressions. All these binary variables group different specific types of events to increase the observation count. For example, "termination and acceleration" may refer to premature loan terminations, reductions in the maturity date or decreases in the loan volume (partial debt retirement before the originally agreed repayment date). 8 Some authors use variables that require additional information, such as the assessment of the relationship by banks or borrowers (Elsas & Krahnen, 1998; Degryse & Ongena, 2005; Beck et al., 2018) . Metrics like personal banking relationships between executives and banks (Karolyi, 2018) have fewer observations, implying a problem in my estimations explaining events like firm exits, which I do not observe very often. 9 As just indicated, only interactions where they acted as leaders before are counted. 10 If there are multiple leaders, the average value is used. To lessen possible time trends due to the period covered by the data (Bharath et al., 2007) , include observations up until 1987 or 7 years before the issuance date of the earliest contract for which this variable is computed and include firm age as a control variable. Since relationship length correlates with firm age, I further replace this variable with an adjusted length value as in Hombert & Matray (2017) as an alternative or drop all relationship length variables. Results when this metric is used are identical to the ones presented here.
Measuring Lending Relationships
11 As with the length measure, averages are used if there are multiple leaders. Results are hardly affected when one divides this frequency by the all number of loans issued by the borrower in total or in the recent past as in Bharath et al. (2007 Bharath et al. ( , 2011 ; Li et al. (2017) . Fourth, a 1 is added if the relationship is "concentrated", for cases where the bank accounts for 50% or more of the aggregate loan volume recorded for all deals for that firm in DealScan during the 5 years preceding the issuance. This is in line with Bharath et al. (2007 Bharath et al. ( , 2011 Fang, Ivashina & Lerner (2013) ; Li et al. (2017) , who use lending volume contributions as a relationship proxy. 1,250 loans or 37% are associated with a concentrated lending relationship.
1,626 loans (48%) in the estimation sample take relationship index values of 0, 400 (12%) are equal to 1, 1,031 (30%) 2, 275 (8%) 3, and 91 (3%) 4. All results hold for alternative measures described in the robustness section (3.4).
Covenant Violations
As is standard in the related literature, I analyze only those firm-quarters and contracts restricting the current ratio, net worth, or tangible net worth to lie above a certain threshold. 12 I follow Chava & Roberts (2008) and the rest of the literature in handling the problems of overlap, dynamic covenants 13 , packages containing multiple facilities with different maturities, and initial covenant violations. To avoid duplication I point the reader towards their article for details. I follow Falato & Liang (2016) in utilizing DealScan amendment files to adjust covenant details and add new covenants to contracts which were not bound by net worth or current ratio covenants originally.
For 8,258 firm-quarters used in estimations the loan with the tightest covenant is bound by the current ratio and for 19,908 firm-quarters by a net worth covenant.
14.6% of firm-quarters are in violation of a covenant and 27.5% of all deals are technically defaulting at some point, which are exactly the shares reported by Chava & Roberts (2008) . With any type of relationship existing defaults are less likely with 13.9% of firm-quarters (25.1% of deals), while observations (deals) in the no-relationship group violate more frequently, with 15.5% (30.8%).
Estimation and Identification

Regression Framework
I estimate two regression equations in this article. Following Chava & Roberts (2008) and related subsequent studies, the baseline regression explaining firm level effects is
and the one explaining contract level outcomes
The subscripts i, j, b, t indicate firm, contract, bank and quarter levels. X i,t−1 and Y j,t−1 are vectors of firm controls and contract controls, both lagged by one quarter (t − 1). η i , δ b , v t are firm, bank, and year-quarter fixed effects. i,t is an error term assumed to be potentially heteroskedastic and correlated within firm observations (Petersen, 2009) . Different dependent variables are used in both equation 1 (the delisting dummy described above) and 2 (specific creditor actions) for some es- at loan origination, which is absent from previous studies, as is the interaction term V iolation i,t−1 × Relation j . The latter captures the differential effect or the "benefit of a lending relationship when a covenant is violated". β 2 is the corresponding main coefficient of interest in this study. However, given the obvious sample differences that must be expected for a split between violating and non-violating firms and for a division between relationship and non-relationship loans, the regressions are unidentified in their current form and without further tests. The following two subsections describe how the problems are addressed.
Local Continuity around the Covenant
Firms that are below the covenant threshold are on average worse in terms of available investment projects, likelihood of failure, quality of management, general credit worthiness. These differences are likely to be at least partially unobservable and hard or impossible to capture by (lagged) controls. There are two ways to disentangle the effect of newly introduced creditor control from these other factors. The first is compare only companies reasonably close to the threshold in a "discontinuity sample", as these can be assumed to be sufficiently similar. The standard in the related literature is an absolute value of 20% of the relative distance to default. The second solution is to include smooth functions of the distance to default (splines) that are assumed to control for all other factors. 14 I include both linear squared default distance functions when analyzing the full sample. When I use the discontinuity sample estamations also include linear splines. In regressions where the discontinuity sample would reduce the observation count or the variation of the dependent variable too much, I construct a "quasi-discontinuity" sample where the default distance width is doubled to 40% and include linear and quadratic splines.
The use of splines or a discontinuity sample allows to interpret the resulting effect of a covenant violation as a causal one only if the rather weak identifying local continuity assumption holds: all factors other than the discontinuous treatment effect must vary continuously around the default threshold (Lee & Lemieux, 2010; Roberts & Whited, 2013) . As argued previously, manipulations by managers to avoid a technical default are unlikely to create a bias due to the precise specification of accounting standards in covenants (Taylor & Sansone, 2007) , the severe penalties (especially in syndicated loans) in the repeated lending game when firms are caught (Chava & Roberts, 2008) , the unrealistic notion of managers being able to consistently fool lenders whose experts review detailed compliance reports of a single creditor regularly (Roberts & Sufi, 2009a) , and the empirical evidence that does not suggest this kind of behavior (Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005) . Real actions taken by managers are more likely (Graham et al., 2005) . However, Chava & Roberts (2008) ; Roberts & Sufi (2009a) argue that this does not appear to produce a problematic bias for the type of dependent variables used in this analysis. Falato & Liang (2016) show through a series of tests on balancing covariates and continuity estimates of the density of the forcing variable that this confidence in the identifying assumption is justified. Since I use almost the exact same regression specification and data I omit these tests here to avoid duplication. Results have the same implications and are available upon request. Instead, I
focus on new problems that result from the analysis of relationships in the next sub-14 Distances to default for current ratio and net worth that are defined respectively as
, where I (Current Ratio i,t ) and I (N et W orth i,t ) are dummy variables that equal one if the firm-quarter observation is bound by a current ratio or net worth covenant, respectively. Current Ratio are the covenant thresholds. In contract level regressions, the i, t in the subscripts become j, t, indicating contract-quarter observations. section.
Another identifying assumption is that of parallel trends for individuals in the treatment and control groups. Related analyses using covenant violations in a regression discontinuity context do not suggest that this may be a source of concern. I confirm this in section 3, where I analyze the issue using investment regressions as an example (see figure 1 ).
Endogenous Lender-Borrower Relations
There are three possible problems specific to the estimation of differential effects of relationship banking in the context of covenant violations: 1. endogenous lenderborrower matching at contract signing due to selective banks; 2. endogenous lenderborrower relationships resulting from different inclinations on the side of banks to terminate a loan; 3. an endogenous covenant threshold and violation likelihood, either due to differences in initial covenant tightness of relationship loans or in the inclination of relationship banks to modify covenants of existing contracts to avoid covenant violations. I will discuss these challenges in this subsection.
The first problem is the most obvious and dramatic one. There may be a selection bias between borrowers and lenders when loans are issued, where banks are more willing and likely to form relationships with higher quality borrowers. These differences could then likely be at least partially unobservable and hard or impossible to be captured by (lagged) controls, because banks have access to soft and to inside information.
Finding a positive effect of the existence of relationship banking on investment or a negative one on the likelihood of default when covenants are violated, could then just be a reflection of the borrower having more valuable investment projects, better future prospects in general, or higher management quality. Research has shown that lenderborrower matching depends on size (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan & Stein, 2005 , and others), geographical proximity (Petersen & Rajan, 1995 , 2002 , bank balance sheet strength (Schwert, 2018) and personal relations between executives (Karolyi, 2018) .
Descriptive statistics in the two columns on the right side of table 1 indeed suggest that most variable means are different between the sample of banks with some type of relationship and the one without any. Relationship loans are associated with fewer violations and higher quality, less opaque firms that have better ratings, higher profitability and are larger. Differences in most control variables are significant at 1% and may partially be due to lender-borrower matching. This is a potentially severe complication and also applicable for a sample split with regards to the the existence of a banking relation as in Chava & Roberts (2008) .
As possible remedies, literature has used lender-borrower distance metrics as instruments (Ross, 2010; Bharath et al., 2011; Dass & Massa, 2011; López-Espinosa et al., 2017; Li et al., 2017) or direct measures of relationship banking (Bolton et al., 2016; Beck et al., 2018) ; propensity score matching estimators (Drucker & Puri, 2005; Bharath et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017) ; borrower IPO events as negative shocks to the value of inside information from relationship lending (Schenone, 2010) In table 9 in the appendix I use the investment baseline regression as an example to show that results from the main table 5 hold when lender-borrower distance is used as an IV or when firm × issuance year fixed effects are added. The latter might make sense as the endogenous lender-borrower matching problem here is primarily a selection problem where unobservables differ at the time of contract signing.
The second potential challenge relates to endogenous lender actions before a covenant is violated but after the credit contract is signed. The relationship-status becomes endogenous when banks are more likely to terminate loan agreements pre-maturely for low quality borrowers. Lenders may only discover the true quality ex post, due to imperfect screening and subsequent monitoring activities. Inferior borrowers with terminated loans would in turn have to approach new lenders. The effect is that contracts to higher quality borrowers are more likely to be classified as relationship loans. This difference and the differential effect of borrower quality when firms default might not be fully captured by control variables. As with initial endogenous lender-borrower matching, relationship measures may become a proxies for unobserved borrower quality. I test if this problem is significant with a set of regressions explaining pre-mature loan terminations from observable changes in borrower quality. For that purpose I estimate
which contains all control variables (plus the relationship variable) and fixed effects from equation 2, but has the dummy variable T ermination j,t that is 1 for any premature contract termination or acceleration as the dependent variable. Accelerations mean that the principal or a part of it is returned prematurely, which is measured as an originally unintended reduction of maturity or volume (without an increase in any of these two terms). 15 loan volume reductions), something that is documented in earlier studies (Roberts & Sufi, 2009a,b; Roberts, 2015) .
The third challenge is a potentially endogenous covenant threshold and violation likelihood. Relationship lenders might issue original loans with looser covenant thresholds, rely less on formal contractual safeguards and instead more on insider knowledge and monitoring. If this is true, the distance-to-default measure itself becomes a proxy for lending relationships and the coefficients would be biased. As far as covenants are complements to monitoring (which relationship lenders do), the opposite may also be the conceivable. Demiroglu & James (2010) show that there is no relation between the number of past lender-borrower interactions and different tightness metrics of the type of covenants used here. Since they analyze the same data I assume that endogenous initial covenant thresholds are not a problem. 
is similar to equation 2, but instead of a covenant violation dummy, it includes the term Exposure j,t−1 . To make it easier finding a relationship that would constitute a problem for my identification strategy, I use industry instead of borrower fixed effect, τ s . 16 The exposure variable is either the distance to default; the change in the distance to default; a dummy that is 1 if the firm is "close" to default (a distance of less than 20% from the threshold); or it is omitted from the regression. It is also interacted with the relationship index. The corresponding β 2 is the coefficient of interest. If it is omitted, focus is on β 1 . Regressions in table 4 reveal that it is insignificant in all specifications, implying that relationship banks are not more inclined to manipulate covenants in general and in response to default threats.
Results
Effects on Investment
The prime metric of interest in the covenant violations literature using regression discontinuity designs is investment, CAPX in percent of lagged total assets (Chava & Roberts, 2008; Demiroglu & James, 2010; Falato & Liang, 2016) . Reproducing the literature, column 1 in table 5 shows that the violation of a covenant reduces CAPX.
The effect is not significant as in other studies, due to the increased number of control variables, the inclusion of quadratic splines and augmentations of the sample. With the exact sample period and control variables, I am able to reproduce their results more closely (available upon request). Using column 2 as the appropriate comparison 16 Results are equivalent when borrower fixed effects are used.
(same fixed effects specification), this effect becomes statistically significant when the borrower has no relationship with the lender. Using the sample mean, the number implies a reduction in investment of 7.5%. If there is any preexisting lending relationship, the effect of a violation is significantly smaller with a decline in capital expenditures of just 2%. For relationships that are more developed because of long, frequent or concentrated lending (or a combination), there is no negative effect on investment at all. The independent variable of interest is the interaction between an index measuring the underwriting banks' relationship with the borrower (described in section 1.2) and the exposure terms, distance to default, the difference in the distance to default (∆(Default Distance)), and a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the relative distance to default is 20% or less ("Close to Default"). See the text and appendix for included control variables. Standard errors are robust and clustered on the borrower level, with ***, **, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. P-values are in parenthesis.
Significance is unaffected and economic magnitudes comparable when interacted fixed effects are introduced to address potentially endogenous lender-borrower matching (column 3). The interaction term between covenant violation and the relationship index continues to be highly significant in the analysis of the discontinuity sample, with similar coefficients (columns 4 and 5).
To get a better feeling for possible lags in the treatment effect and to validate the 
Effects on Firm Exit
A second interesting real outcome previously analyzed in the context of covenant violations by Demiroglu & James (2010) and Nini et al. (2012) , is the exit of companies. 17
The delisting dummy used here is identical to the latter of these studies and similar to the former one. There are two major differences to the CAPX regressions. First, the small number of exit observations (162) Falato & Liang (2016) . The independent variable of interest is the interaction between a covenant violation dummy and an index measuring the underwriting banks' relationship with the borrower (described in section 1.2). Splines are distances to default functions for current ratio and net worth covenants. The discontinuity sample includes only observations in which borrowers are close to violating a covenant, ±20% around the threshold. See the text and appendix for included control variables. "-" indicates that a fixed effect is absorbed by a set of interacted fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered on the borrower level, with ***, **, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. P-values are in parenthesis. V iolation i,t refers to a set of dummy variables on the borrowertreatment quarter level from 4 quarter before to 4 quarter after a covenant violation. Confidence intervals show the 95% significance level with standard errors computed on the state-year level.
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These are the baseline regressions in table 6. In equation 1 I show that the likelihood of a distressed exit increases significantly (at 1%) following a covenant violation, in line with the literature. In economic terms the increase is significant as well, from less than 0.1% to over 1.6% following a covenant violation. The liquidation threat increase for violators with no prior relationship to their creditor is 26% larger relative to those with a relationship. Compared to relations that are the most developed (using an index value of 4), the increase in the chance of a firm exit is more than 4 times higher for transaction-based relations. The result are similar for borrower fixed effects (column 3), and firm × bank fixed effects (column 4). I am able to run regressions on a "quasidiscontinuity" sample (with an distance to default of +/-40, not 20%) for a broader alternative definition for exit with 394 exit observations. Results are equivalent to findings in table 6 and details are described in section 3.4. (2010); Nini et al. (2012) . The independent variable of interest is the interaction between a covenant violation dummy and an index measuring the underwriting banks' relationship with the borrower (described in section 1.2). Splines are distances to default functions for current ratio and net worth covenants. See the text and appendix for included control variables. "-" indicates that a fixed effect is absorbed by a set of interacted fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered on the borrower level, with ***, **, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. P-values are in parenthesis.
Differences in Bank Behavior
So far I documented how relationship banking has a positive causal effect on investment and a negative one on the likelihood of a company exit when firms enter a technical default. This shows that creditor control is indeed a channel explaining at least part of the positive effects of relationship banking on borrowers documented in the literature.
In this subsection I am attempting to pin down how exactly relationship banks behave differently and support a potentially troubled firm. For this end I utilize data from DealScan Amendments. Unlike in previous regressions in this paper and the literature, the analytical level is the deal, not the firm. 18 To shed light on the precise 18 Using the facility as the unit of analysis yields identical results but is less appropriate as covenants mechanics of the creditor control channel I explain the probability of a creditor taking any action as in Bodenhorn (2003), Nini et al. (2009) and Roberts & Sufi (2009b) A proper discontinuity sample would reduce the number of exact renegotiation outcomes too dramatically, suggesting that an analysis of a "quasi-discontinuity" sample is preferred over a smaller discontinuity sample. Reverting to the specification in column (2) as a baseline and to panel A, the decrease in the chance of experiencing a loan renegotiation is entirely driven by transacare defined and amended for an entire package. Facilities often just represent tranches for different types of participating investors. 19 The regressions include 424 firm-quarters with increases in maturity of volume, 478 waivers, eliminations or relaxers of covenants, and 114 instances of interest rate appreciation. For any relationship that goes back further in time, involves many previous loans or is associated with relatively large transactions, the effect is nil. For borrowers with the most developed relationships, covenant waivers following a technical default are 50% more likely than before the violation. This evidence from both volume/maturity increases and covenant waivers suggests that relationship lenders are less likely to harm borrower by becoming passive when they are in trouble and dependent on banks.
They even rush to support their most loyal partners when times are tough. Roberts & Sufi (2009a,b) and Nini et al. (2009) . The independent variable of interest is the interaction between a covenant violation dummy and an index measuring the underwriting banks' relationship with the borrower (see section 1.2). See the text and appendix for included control variables. "-" indicates that a fixed effect is absorbed by a set of interacted fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered on the borrower level, with ***, **, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. P-values are in parenthesis.
Robustness
Since the inclusion of "bad controls" can bias the results, I run the regressions without controls as a robustness exercise that does not change the results dramatically and that can be found in tables 11 and 12 the online appendix. Significance in some of the regressions explaining Capx, renegotiations, and covenant waivers increases, while all others are unaffected.
In a similar vain I re-run all regressions with a different relationship measure in the tables 13 and 14 the online appendix. It is again based on all variables already used in the relationship index, the pre-existing relationship dummy, the relationship duration 
Conclusion
This study analyzes the value of banking relationships for borrowers when control rights shift towards lenders upon a violation of a financial covenant. Reproducing findings from the literature that debtors are adversely affected, I find that investment experiences a significantly smaller reduction and the threat of liquidations or stock market delistings increases to a much lesser extend whenever relationships exist or are more developed. These results are robust and not driven by endogenous lenderborrower matching or behavioral differences of relationship banks before covenants are violated. Exploring how exactly relationship lenders behave differently, I find evidence that they are more inclined to renegotiate loans, extend maturities, and increase loan volumes, grant covenant waivers. Unlike arm's length lenders, relationship banks are not becoming less willing to (favorably) renegotiate loans. Those with strong relationships even become more active and support borrowers that depend on creditors.
However, banks generally abstain from actively harming borrowers with loan terminations, accelerations and loan volume reductions after a technical default.
Overall, relationship banking is beneficial for borrowers when they are at the mercy of lenders. To the extend that liquidations, stock market delistings and reductions in CAPX during times of financial distress are associated with frictions, banking relationships have an easing effect, help overcome at least some information problems and reduce social costs associated with financial distress. A promising task for future research is investigating if this has long-run or net benefits or if a less stringent financial regime erodes managerial discipline and reallocates financial resources to sub-optimal investments (Peek & Rosengren, 2005; Caballero, Hoshi & Kashyap, 2008) . This table reports results from regressing investment on a covenant violation measure, a measure of the underwriting banks' relationship with the borrower, and an interaction term between the violation and relationship variables. Relationships are me measured with an index that combines the presence of any, recent, long, frequent, and leadbank relationships. Splines are linear and squared distances to default functions for current ratio and net worth covenants. The physical distance between borrower and lender headquarters are used as an IV in regression (2). See the text and appendix for included control variables. "-" indicates that a fixed effect is absorbed by a set of interacted fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered on the borrower level, with ***, **, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. P-values are in parenthsis. This table reports results from logit regressions of the likelihood of a distressed exit on a covenant violation measure, a measure of the underwriting banks' relationship with the borrower, and an interaction term between the violation and relationship variables. A distressed exit is defined as a liquidation, bankruptcy, stock market delisting, or a merger or acquisition during a period of distress (see the appendix for details). Relationships are me measured with an index that combines the presence of any, recent, long, frequent, and lead-bank relationships. Splines are linear and squared distances to default functions for current ratio and net worth covenants. The quasidiscontinuity sample includes only observations in which borrowers are not too far from violating a covenant (±40% around the threshold). See the text and appendix for included control variables. "-" indicates that a fixed effect is absorbed by a set of interacted fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered on the borrower level, with ***, **, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. P-values are in parenthesis.
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Online Appendix Nini et al. (2012) . The independent variable of interest is the interaction between a covenant violation dummy and an index measuring the underwriting banks' relationship with the borrower (described in section 1.2). Splines are distances to default functions for current ratio and net worth covenants. The (quasi-)discontinuity sample includes only observations in which borrowers are close to violating a covenant, ±20% (±40%) around the threshold. See the text and appendix for included control variables. "-" indicates that a fixed effect is absorbed by a set of interacted fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered on the borrower level, with ***, **, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. P-values are in parenthesis. Roberts & Sufi (2009a,b) and Nini et al. (2009) . The independent variable of interest is the interaction between a covenant violation dummy and an index measuring the underwriting banks' relationship with the borrower (see section 1.2). See the text and appendix for included control variables. "-" indicates that a fixed effect is absorbed by a set of interacted fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered on the borrower level, with ***, **, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. P-values are in parenthesis. Chava & Roberts (2008) , Demiroglu & James (2010) , and Falato & Liang (2016) . In panel B the dependent variable is an exit dummy for liquidations and stock exchange delistings as in Demiroglu & James (2010); Nini et al. (2012) . The independent variable of interest is the interaction between a covenant violation dummy and a variable measuring the underwriting banks' relationship with the borrower (described in section 3.4). Splines are distances to default functions for current ratio and net worth covenants. The (quasi-)discontinuity sample includes only observations in which borrowers are close to violating a covenant, ±20% (±40%) around the threshold. See the text and appendix for included control variables. "-" indicates that a fixed effect is absorbed by a set of interacted fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered on the borrower level, with ***, **, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. P-values are in parenthesis. Roberts & Sufi (2009a,b) and Nini et al. (2009) . The independent variable of interest is the interaction between a covenant violation dummy and an index measuring the underwriting banks' relationship with the borrower (see section 1.2). See the text and appendix for included control variables. "-" indicates that a fixed effect is absorbed by a set of interacted fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered on the borrower level, with ***, **, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. P-values are in parenthesis.
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